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Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose 
This article discusses exploratory research into the perceptions of British Muslims towards Islamist 
ideological messaging to contribute to the general debate on ‘radicalisation’. The article discusses 
the findings of discussion groups in the light of research previously undertaken in the 
propaganda/psychology fields, from the perspective of Reversal Theory. 
 
Methodology/approach 
Four focus groups were undertaken with a mixture of Bangladeshi and Pakistani British Muslims 
who were shown a selection of Islamist propaganda media clips, garnered from the internet. The 
research is intended to provide exploratory indications of how British Muslims receive Islamist 
communication messages in order to provoke further research in this critical field. 
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Findings 
We propose that Islamist communications focus on eliciting change in emotional states, specifically 
inducing the paratelic-excitement mode, by focusing around a meta-narrative of Muslims as a 
unitary grouping self-defined as victim to Western aggression. Early indicators are that some genres 
of Islamist propaganda may be more effective than others in generating these emotional change 
states (e.g. cartoons) and some groupings appear to be more susceptible than others. We conclude 
that our British Muslim respondents were unsympathetic to the Islamist ideological messaging 
contained in our sample of propaganda clips. 
 
Research limitations/implications 
The research highlights the difficulties in undertaking research in such a sensitive field. We propose 
a series of four testable propositions to guide future research looking specifically at whether those 
subjects who are more likely to be excited by Islamist communication include those with weakly 
held identities, younger males, those feeling contempt for Western culture, and the use of specific 
media genre formats. 
 
Originality/value of paper 
The   article   provides   an   insight   into   how   British   Muslims   might   respond   to   Islamist 
communications, indicating that whilst most are not susceptible to inducement of paratelic- 
excitement,  others  are  likely  to  be,  dependent  on  which  genre  of  clip  is  used,  the  messages 
contained therein, and who that clip is targeted at. 
 
Keywords 
Propaganda, political marketing, reversal theory, British Muslims 
 
Classification 
Research paper 
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The Dark Side of Political Marketing: 
Islamist Propaganda, Reversal Theory and British Muslims 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Political marketing is a key sub-discipline traditionally associated with the marketing of politicians 
and candidates, and its methods and techniques, e.g. opinion polling, focus grouping, negative and 
permanent campaigning, persuasive audio-visual communications, have increasingly been used by 
social pressure groups to change government policy. It is also recognised that political marketing, 
especially the American negative campaigning variety, is a marketing/propaganda hybrid 
(O’Shaughnessy, 1999). Nevertheless, there is still limited recognition of the importance of emotion 
in  voter decision-making.  A  more recent,  and disturbing phenomenon is the use, albeit in its 
infancy, of emotional messaging by terrorist groups to recruit and retain members and advocate their 
own causes. This article seeks to identify how terrorists groups are using emotional messaging, in 
particular, through audio-visual broadcasts made available on the internet and through broadcast 
media channels, to recruit and retain members and advocate Islamic extremism amongst select 
constituent groupings. 
 
International terrorism is a key political issue in Britain today. A Populus/Times Muslims Poll 
(2005) found that 12% of 18-24 year-olds believes suicide bombings against civilians to be 
legitimate. The next year the same poll found that 13% of British Muslims believe that the four 
suicide bombers of July 7, 2005 should be regarded as ‘martyrs’ while 7% said that attacks on UK 
civilians could be justified in some circumstances (The Times, 2006). Such attitudes amongst British 
Muslims could indicate a reservoir of potential Al Qaeda and Muslim fundamentalist recruits. 
However, a significant leap in belief needs to take place from indicating support on an opinion 
survey to sitting on a packed train with a suicide belt-bomb. Al Qaeda as an organisational group 
has been defined in three ways: 1) as a hard core of militants based in Afghanistan providing other 
Islamic militant groups around the world with funds and/or training like a university disbursing 
‘grants’ for selected military operations and facilities like libraries and Islamist teaching facilities 
and 2) like a venture capitalist supporting and funding selected ideas for military operations 
submitted from a variety of interested Islamist groupings and 3) an organisation funding military 
operations and propaganda production like a TV production company commissions films, books and 
newspaper articles from freelance operators, often rejecting the majority (Burke, 2007). Given these 
commercial parallels, we can talk of the use of marketing/propaganda methods by terrorist groups, 
which so often accompany atrocious acts like the 9-11 attacks in the USA or 7-7 bombings in the 
UK, as the ‘dark side’ of political marketing. There is anecdotal evidence that the process of 
radicalisation can occur over a short time period (Razzaque, 2008). If we believe the British 
broadsheet media, Islamic youth are radicalised by perambulatory DVDs and other media aimed 
directly at them (Jaber and Allen-Mills, 2005; Wheatcroft, 2006). Central to our thesis is the notion 
that terrorists and their backers are not born but persuaded through propaganda (Powell, 1967), 
particularly where this is a call to identify with the aims of war (Bernays, 1942; Finch, 2000). 
 
We are evidencing political marketing/propaganda techniques being used to inculcate in vulnerable 
sections of society an attitude or state suggesting suicide bombing and the violent Jihadi mission of 
Islamists is honourable and just. Not surprisingly, this secondary narrative concerns many 
government policy-makers. The question we seek to begin to answer is: are British Muslims 
persuaded by Islamist propaganda? If so, how might that be and via what genre of media 
communication?  Previous  attempts  to  determine  how  propaganda  imagery  and  messages  are 
received by their audience have been superficial although O’Shaughnessy (2002, 2004) examined 
the content of Al–Qaeda videos before and in the immediate aftermath of ‘9-11’, considering such 
persuasive devices as the use of fast-moving imagery, ‘atrocity’ propaganda, anti-Semite hyperbole, 
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and editorial sleight of hand. But no-one has yet investigated how British Muslims per se perceive 
or receive militant Islamist propaganda material. 
 
The Communicative Environment 
That a threat to British Muslims is seen to exist is unquestionable. The UK Home Office began to 
track Muslim opinion through seven working parties after the July 2004 terrorist attacks (House of 
Commons, 2006)1. What the report fails to cover is the core issue of how such ostensibly ordinary 
Muslims become terrorist sympathisers or what role propaganda plays in apparent personality 
change. Michael (2004:12) recognised ‘signs of exclusion’ in young Pakistani Muslims. The 
FCO/Home Office report on Young Muslims and Extremism (Michael, 2004), found three factors 
which attracted some to extremism: 1) anger at the ‘double standards’ of British foreign policy in 
relation to Palestine and Iraq for example, 2) alienation following attempts to integrate modern 
Islamic identity with modern secular society, and 3) activism to reduce various perceived ills in the 
society around them. Yet again despite this prognosis, the question arises as to how such apparent 
ordinary Muslims empathise with suicide-bombers and martyrs-elect. What role, if any, does 
propaganda plays in framing these anxieties and does it per se radicalise British Muslims? 
 
One theory which may help is Reversal Theory (Apter, 1984, 2007). Its merit is that, unlike the 
theories  of  mainstream  cognitive  psychology,  it  is  not  grounded  in  an  assumption  of rational 
process. Given that much of the existing literature in political marketing assumes rationality and 
focuses principally on voting at present, rather than generating motivational support or activism per 
se, Reversal Theory provides some understanding of how terrorists seek to develop their activist 
support  bases.  The  basic  assertion  is  that  as  arousal  increases,  it  becomes  either  increasingly 
pleasant or increasingly unpleasant. When the high arousal is pleasant, there is excitement, and 
when high arousal is unpleasant there is anxiety. Similarly, when low arousal is unpleasant, there is 
boredom and when low arousal is pleasant, we have relaxation (O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy, 
2002). This means that there are two ways of experiencing arousal, one which runs from relaxation 
to anxiety as arousal increases, and the other that runs from boredom to excitement as arousal 
increases. The thesis of Reversal Theory is that we often switch between these two modes. Thus, 
people seek the arousal of excitement or avoid the arousal of anxiety. In Reversal Theory, the two 
modes of high arousal-excitement and high arousal-anxiety are mutually exclusive in that people 
can be either in one mode or the other but not both simultaneously (O’Shaughnessy and 
O’Shaughnessy, 2002). The theory speaks of a ‘telic’ mode, where goal achievement is paramount, 
or a ‘paratelic’ mode, where the enjoyment of the activity itself is primary. This would be relevant 
to terrorism, where the intrinsic satisfaction of carrying out the task, vengeance gratified, is often 
more important than the instrumentality of the terror act. The attractions of terrorism, it follows, are 
intrinsic not instrumental. Terrorists frequently fail in their actions. Yet participants do not view 
themselves as failures. We therefore suggest that terrorists are acting within a paratelic mode, which 
is associated with a high arousal of excitement. In other words, the excitement of terrorist 
involvement may well be the key to its very attraction (see Apter, 2007, on the role of excitement 
inducement for those seeking to involve themselves in military combat and crime). 
 
In the telic mode, on the other hand, the reward lies with the sense of moving nearer towards the 
accomplishment of some objective rather than the involving nature of the activity itself: in telic 
mode we avoid anxiety with its concomitant high arousal. Anxiety is absent in the paratelic mode, 
but it is often present in the telic mode, while conversely, there is always some excitement or 
boredom in the paratelic mode but not in the telic mode. Thus, we can discount the telic mode as 
usually irrelevant for would-be terrorists. 
 
 
1  Fifty-two people were killed (including the four suicide bombers) and more than 700 injured by 4 separate, co- 
ordinated, suicide bomb attacks on London’s transport and bus system. 
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The logic of Reversal Theory is that there is a movement between these polarities over the course of 
a relatively short time period, or even during a single day. Typically for example, we may be in telic 
mode, focused and goal oriented, in the office, but in paratelic mode, sensation-seeking, during the 
weekend evenings. But, as Apter (1984) stresses, individuals can be more or less permanently 
trapped in one mode or the other. There are people who can never escape the paratelic mode with its 
polarities of boredom–excitement, and others are frozen in telic mode, typically for example, those 
people we might describe as ‘workaholics’. In applying this to the study of terrorism and terrorist 
propaganda, we believe that Reversal Theory has a critical role to play in leading us to a deeper 
understanding of the attraction of terrorism and the (cyber-) texts that terrorists produce for global 
consumption  to  initiate  terrorist  activism.  The  value  of  the  theory  is  as  a  descriptor  of  a 
psychological condition which yields a predisposition  to involvement in acts of terror, and which 
terrorist media intuitively exploits to freeze permanently the potential terrorist in the paratelic mode. 
They capture its essence and chart a journey from boredom via arousal to excitement. They are 
targeted at people who feel trapped by boredom, e.g. inter-generational tension, the tedium of 
unemployment, the absence of a vision of the future. The thirst for excitement, this rejection of a 
boring life with its sense of entrapment, could act as triggers to join an insurgency and to find out 
more about Al Qaeda or other Islamist groupings. 
 
Terrorist media as a genre are part of a totality of cognitive context whose product is the high 
arousal of the paratelic mode and may be said to exhibit the following properties designed to induce 
and sustain a paratelic mode in conjunction with other stimuli (see Appendix 1): 
 
1)  Excitement - The attraction of Al Qaeda is the allure of excitement, the promise of adventure 
and thrilling sensations for young men who crave action and glorify heroism. 
2)  Dynamism - These narratives are dynamic, packed with drama and the consequences of that 
action, and are carefully edited for pace and attention span. With their lurid imagery and 
logo systems, they can be reminiscent of MTV. 
3)  Decoding - There is no need for terrorist media texts to be read or decoded through the 
agency of some prior tutelage. No real understanding of Islam is needed. Their appeal is to 
the theologically illiterate, for example, Islam like all the Abrahamic faiths explicitly forbids 
suicide, and yet such media glorify it. In this sense, Al Qaeda for example, is disconnected 
from its religious roots and making a universal appeal to a universal male: young men have 
always sought these things, otherwise wars could never be fought. We should not 
underestimate the power of an appeal whose sole function is to legitimate violent action 
without excessive elaboration of the justifications. The target individuals may well know 
little if anything about the political situation of their own locality or of the wider Muslim 
community and be in no position to know whether it is, in fact, oppressed as suggested or 
not. The key point is excitement not politics, and the need is to provide a simple, superficial 
justification for adventure. 
4)  Power - People are attracted to power, powerful individuals and powerful organisations even 
if these are evil, and this means a concomitant attraction to the symbols of power. The very 
qualities that frighten are those that also attract. Burke (2007) cites Ahmed Ressam, the 
failed would-be Los Angeles airport bomber, as actively seeking Bin Laden’s blessing so 
that he could credit the attacks to ‘the sheikh’. 
5)  Alterity – Islamist media create an ‘us’ and ‘them’, alien-like feel. They are a summons to 
defend  ‘your’  tribe,  they  romanticise  violence,  and  they  portray  the  enemy  as  the 
quintessence of evil. It is important to understand the exclusionary nature of this appeal and 
the huge importance of justified, gratified revenge. 
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Methodology 
Technique and Sample 
Given  our  intention  to  explore  the  emotional  resonance  of  Islamist  media  clips  with  British 
Muslims, we used a discussion group methodological approach given its usefulness in the context of 
developing collective testimonies and group resistance narratives (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 641), 
and because the format “provides support to its members in the expression of anxiety-provoking or 
socially unpopular ideas” (Goldman, 1962). The discussion group was introduced into the social 
sciences in the 1940s to investigate reactions to war time radio programming (Merton, 1987) and 
political scientists, and practitioners, increasingly use this approach to understand audience political 
perceptions and motivations (see Gould, 1999), because “they are important for making audible the 
voices of oppressed people who are demanding to be heard” (Madriz, 2000). The notion that 
discussion  groups  will  not  work  for  sensitive  topics  is  a  myth  (Morgan,  1998).  But  group 
discussions have another vital role in qualitative research: they are particularly useful in proposition 
development (Bellenger, Berhardt and Goldstucker, 1976) in the early developmental stage of a 
discipline. Therefore, our primary aim is to: Explore the perceptions and emotional responses of 
selected British Muslim groups towards Islamist ideological broadcast messaging with a view to 
informing future research in this field. 
 
We aimed to determine what would be respondents’ perceptions of, and emotional responses to, the 
content, message and style of the clips. Four discussion groups were conducted: two in London (in 
Edgware, Bangladeshi women 18-36 years old and Tower Hamlets, Bangladeshi males 18-34 years 
old), one in the Midlands (Birmingham, Pakistani men, 18-28 years old) and one in Dewsbury 
(Pakistani mothers, all ages) in areas of relatively high Muslim population density (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Group Characteristics 
 
GROUP REGION NATIONALITY/RELIGION AGE GROUP 
SIZE 
COMMENTS 
Young 
Male 
Edgware,  North 
London 
Bangladeshi Muslim 18-34 4 Comprised 3 Muslims and one revert2. 
Young 
Female 
Tower  Hamlets, 
East London 
Mixed Muslim 18-36 9 Comprised women who had either recently 
arrived from a Muslim country or had been 
born  in  the  UK.  Some  wore  the  hijab, 
others did not. 
Female 
Mothers 
Dewsbury, West 
Yorkshire 
Pakistani Muslim All 
ages 
8 2  members  illiterate  in  English/Urdu,  3 
English illiterate but could speak Basic 
English and Urdu literature. Most resident 
in the UK for 20 years or more. 
Young 
Male 
Birmingham, 
East Midland 
Pakistani Muslim 18-28 10 Convened a month after the other 3 groups 
in August 2006 but before the Heathrow 
bomb scare. 
 
Respondents were recruited by Ipsos MORI street interviewers in groups of 4-10 participants, with 
each group lasting 1½ to 2½ hours, using trained Muslim moderators briefed on the sensitivity of 
the research and the need to reassure respondents (Kay, 2001). Some would-be respondents were 
wary of participating. Although, the discussion group approach is not without fault (Mitofsky, 
1995), for this stage of theory development and given the topic of the research, the group discussion 
approach was enlightening. Respondents were questioned on their perceived identity, the types of 
Islamist communications they had seen, and their views of the selected audio-visual clips. Five clips 
were used, selected from a broad range of Islamist ideological media material (hosted by the Middle 
East Media Research Institute - memritv.org) to reflect a range of genres of audio-visual material 
that Muslims might be subjected to in their daily lives (see Appendix 1 for a brief synopsis of each 
 
2 He became a practising Muslim later in his life and referred to himself in this way rather than as a convert, which he 
might have taken to mean that he was not a ‘good’ Muslim at some point previously. 
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clip). Given the exploratory nature of this research, our selection was neither exhaustive nor 
scientific, instead we seek to explore certain genres of media clip to determine whether some might 
have more emotional resonance than others. The group discussions were audio-taped and fully 
transcribed. Discussion groups have limitations in that their findings are not generalisable across the 
population (see Mitofsky, 1995) but they are very useful in development of theory and hypotheses. 
It is possible that those with extreme views refused to take part, so there might be an element of self 
de-selection, which was possible with our Bangladeshi male group. Respondents’ views may also 
have been influenced by the very material the participants watched and discussed: the so-called 
‘Hawthorne’ effect3, especially where they had not seen this or similar material previously. 
 
 
Findings 
Our findings provide an understanding of what the Islamist message senders might be trying to 
convey to our Muslim respondents and how these messages emotionally resonated. Given the focus 
of the research, it is important to understand the cultural background of our subjects. To the 
respondents,  practising Islam  was ‘Jihad’ in itself: the struggle to internalize and practice the 
religion as it permeates their daily lives and interactions, and their identity. For men, it was how 
they interact with women, i.e. things they were/not allowed to do and say in the company of women 
and suppression of sexual thoughts. Being Muslim was described variously as a way of life”, and 
“…the way we eat, the way we sleep, the way we go to the toilet, the way we get up in a morning”. 
When considering their own identity, most respondents had complex juxtaposed notions of these 
which might actually make some more susceptible to Islamist messaging than others, as these 
comments from the discussion groups indicate: 
 
“If I were to go to Bangladesh … it would feel just like a holiday … I am part of England and I 
love it.” 
“On paper I am Muslim and British and my parents are Pakistani. What comes first is Muslim, 
Pakistani, and then British. I don’t really know what being British is.” 
“Getting a British passport doesn’t make you British.” 
 
But there was also some evidence of contempt for what Muslims perceive to be British culture 
because “our values are not to drink, not to go out and fornicate, and here there is a bit of a culture 
to go out clubbing.” 
 
The  media  clips,  readily  available  to  all  over  the  internet,  are  distributed  by  two  source 
organisations: a virtual state, Al Qaeda, and a real one, Iranian terrestrial television, and both glorify 
terrorism. Yet, there are no perceptible ethical differences in the nature of their proselytisation. The 
distinction lies in the quality of the production values. These media clips are modern. God is 
marginal in the rhetoric. The clips parody western cultural and communications norms, probably not 
ironically, representing the cultural interface product as hybridized text emanating from a blend of 
East and West. Behind both militant Islamist propaganda products lies the conviction of a global 
conspiracy against Islam. The line of argument indicates that global conspiracy must be met by 
global conspiracy, and it is the perception of a global war to win the freedom and independence of 
what the propagandists see, and wish to establish as, a trans-national Muslim nation – the umma 
ruled by a Caliph. Ideas which simplify and universalize are always problematic but they have the 
attraction of creating sharp coherence out of a complex, contradictory and nuanced world (Ellul, 
1973; O’Shaughnessy 2004). Terror organizations are willing to communicate as never before, to 
articulate their deeds through propaganda: 
 
3  The idea that the very act of interviewing effects what you are measuring was confirmed by a series of celebrated 
experiments in productivity in the US between 1924-33 by psychology researchers at the Hawthorne works of the 
Western Electric Company in Chicago. The effect is to social science what Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle is to the 
natural sciences: namely measuring an effect alters that effect through the very act of measurement. 
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The aim of modern propaganda is … to provoke action … to make the individual cling irrationally to a process 
of action. It is no longer to lead to a choice, but to loosen the reflexes … to arouse an active and mythical 
belief (Ellul, 1973). 
 
Consequently, there is now a much greater volume of communication of Islamist Jihadi messaging, 
particularly using media clips across the internet (Kimmage, 2008). Given our hypothesis that 
propagandists might be seeking to use Islamist communications to convert bored British Muslims 
into suicide bombers, we evaluate the discussion groups’ responses, with a view to determining how 
this messaging is emotionally received by our subjects. 
 
The Impact of Propaganda 
The responses of the members of the discussion groups to each of the five media clips are outlined 
in Table 2. Without sharing the culture of which these symbol systems are a part, westerners 
(including Muslims born in Britain) are deaf to some of their meaning and nuance, for example 
where the wrongs done to Palestinians becomes the universal symbol of all Muslim weakness and 
victimhood. The Iranian cartoon and ‘martyr’ video offer another instance in recalling the murder of 
Palestinian boys. Martyrdom is the big idea, the meta-narrative, that underscores the imagery 
watched by our respondents. Martyrdom is also central to the myth-making process surrounding 
historical propaganda as Nazi propagandist Goebbels recognised as his key task (Baird, 1992). 
 
The very brevity of these media clips suits modern attention spans and sound-bite culture. The 
images constitute a pastiche of Western consumer media, striking some false chords and 
encountering credibility problems with more media-savvy British Muslim youth. These are after all 
visually literate contemporary British citizens whose primary identifier may be Islam but whose 
perceptual conditioning influences are those of modern Britain. In the lives of the respondents, there 
are  many  competing  information  systems  on  Islamist  and  Islamic  issues  inside  communities, 
families and kinship groups. We can talk of a competitive marketplace of information to win ‘hearts 
and minds’, accessible to all its protagonists whether propagandists, governments or special-interest 
groups. 
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Table 2: Emotional Responses 
 
CLIP CHARACTERISTICS RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS 
Clip Genre Distribution Young Males, North 
London 
Mothers, 
Dewsbury 
Young Females, East 
London 
Young Males Birmingham 
1 Music 
Video 
Parody 
IRIB/Jamm-e- 
Jam3 (Iran) 
Characterised as 
Bollywood style 
overly-dramatic, with 
poor music and 
attractive lead 
characters. Triggered 
laughter given 
modern/funky format 
and overly anti- 
Western content. Not 
felt likely to influence 
UK Muslims despite 
clear message 
encouraging suicide 
bombing. 
Did not understand 
it, even with the 
(English) language 
translation, thinking 
it to be love story. 
Felt it was “a recruitment 
video targeted at young 
men”. Felt empathy for 
people who are “forced” 
into taking such actions 
and have nothing to live 
for. This group felt that 
the message was for 
mothers/wives/sons and 
that Jihad was about 
sacrificing their loved 
ones for a cause. 
Respondents’ comments 
guarded, intimating their 
understanding of the 
bridegroom’s plight, their 
“understanding of why some 
people feel compelled to 
attack Israel”. People who 
see this “might copy” the 
act, reacting to the message 
that “the Western world is 
corrupt”. 
2 Animated 
Cartoon 
IRIB/Jamm-e- 
Jam3 (Iran) 
Clip “lacked a sense 
of reality” and was not 
“likely to influence 
young Muslims” 
because it was 
animation. 
Induced powerful 
reaction, visibly 
changing moods: 
one lady had tears in 
her eyes. They could 
“feel the pain of the 
boy, as they were 
mothers 
themselves”. Clip 
urged young people 
to “take action” 
because of perceived 
injustice: “If kids 
see too much of this 
stuff they take it on 
board, kids are 
susceptible”. 
Clip saddened this group 
at the helplessness of the 
situation and the 
desperation of children 
and families living in 
camps. The clip showed 
“the reality of what is 
happening”. Respondents 
with children were 
particularly worried 
about the impact the 
clips would have on their 
own children describing 
it as “sinister”. 
One respondent likened 
animation to reality of the 
Muslim’s plight, indicating 
susceptibility to the 
message: “There seems to be 
such a disparity between the 
Israeli soldiers with their 
machine guns and the 
children with their stones. I 
know it is a cartoon but there 
is the reality as well”. 
“Capturing military soldiers 
[sic] is completely different 
from killing average people 
living in the suburbs of 
Palestine”. 
3 Al- 
Zawahiri 
‘Talking 
Head’ 
Al Qaeda/Al 
Jazeera (Qatar) 
Clip triggered ‘head- 
nodding’, in 
agreement. Leader felt 
to have spoken the 
truth about young 
Muslim children dying 
at the hands of the 
West. Content not 
considered factual by 
most and should be 
taken with a “pinch of 
salt”. Where ‘live’ 
footage used (Muslims 
firing cruise missiles), 
respondents felt the 
message likely to 
muster support 
amongst those 
Muslims already 
corrupted or easily 
swayed. 
Clip not understood, 
as they did not 
understand Arabic 
and the English 
subtitles were too 
fast-moving. The 
speech regarded as 
“boring”. 
Clip not well-received. 
They felt that the 
speeches and images 
make the situation worse 
for Muslims. Notably, 
this group had less to say 
than others. 
Respondents agreed that 
America adopted an 
hypocritical and bullying 
posture in relation to the 
United Nations, in relation 
to pushing through 
resolutions which allowed 
the invasion of Iraq, for 
example: “Up to [a] point, 
most of what he [Al- 
Zawahiri] said made sense”. 
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Table 2: Emotional Responses Continued 
 
CLIP CHARACTERISTICS RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS 
Clip Genre Distribution Young Males, 
North London 
Mothers, Dewsbury Young Females, 
East London 
Young Males 
Birmingham 
4 Siddiqu 
e Khan 
‘Talking 
Head’ 
Al Qaeda/Al 
Jazeera 
(Qatar) 
Mohammed 
Siddique Khan felt 
to have been 
“gravely 
misguided”, having 
been “brainwashed” 
by Islamist leaders. 
The respondents 
were saddened that 
he had chosen to 
commit suicide. 
Some respondents had 
seen this clip before. 
Condemned violence 
and the London 
killings. One 
respondent indicated 
it would be wrong to 
judge an individual 
for his actions without 
knowing “the full 
story”. Sympathy 
subtly extended to 
him. Something must 
have happened to him 
for him to “take such 
steps”. Most felt that 
his message was 
inherently wrong: “He 
says he is killing and 
taking revenge in the 
name of Allah but 
Allah doesn’t tell you 
to kill people. It is 
wrong.” 
Respondents angry, 
shocked, “quite 
shaky”, to see 
educated, articulate 
young man in this 
action. “Listening 
to the words … sent 
shivers down my 
spine”. Sympathy 
for suicide bomber 
exists: “how and 
what happens to 
transform a young 
person into a 
terrorist?” and 
“this feeling of 
frustration at not 
being heard, you 
can see why he 
does it”. Clip most 
likely persuade 
those who already 
feel alienated and 
aggravated. 
Group tended to 
disagree with the way he 
reacted but sympathised 
with his view that 
Muslims are being 
oppressed. Sidique 
Khan’s actions were 
projected as a powerful 
metaphor, likened to a 
“battered wife killing her 
husband”. The 
implication being that 
this was an action 
worthy of sympathy and 
clemency. 
5 Al 
Qaeda 
News 
Bulletin 
Al 
Qaeda/Internet The faux Al-Qaeda news broadcast 
surprised the group, 
due to the film’s 
modern format. The 
group    disagreed 
with what was said 
and felt the ‘news 
coverage’ to be 
extremely biased. 
Clip confused the 
group with talk about 
Hurricane Katrina and 
people suffering and 
the firing of guns in 
the small inset in the 
clip. To this group, 
Jihad had multiple 
meanings. For some, 
it was fighting for 
your rights, for others 
it was about religious 
struggle. Two of the 
women claimed to 
have never heard of 
the word ‘Jihad’. 
Group alienated by 
the subject’s views 
on Katrina and the 
joy Al-Zawahiri 
felt about the 
destruction caused. 
They were 
saddened by such 
events and loss of 
life, and the 
framing of it as a 
supernatural act of 
Islamic justice. 
They were quite 
literally 
“disgusted” at his 
views although 
they felt that such 
images could affect 
young men. 
Group find this a “trite” 
and “comical” 
communication full of 
“black and white ideas”, 
although one respondent 
felt that he probably did 
not receive the full 
message because it was 
originally in Arabic – a 
language he did not 
understand - and that 
language is full of 
imagery. 
 
Applying Reversal Theory 
Next, we briefly consider each of the media clips from the perspective of the application of Reversal 
Theory and the impact of the media clips on the discussion groups witnessing them, as follows: 
 
Music Video Parody – The clip seemed designed to trigger a paratelic mode, and all those elements 
we identify such as dynamic action are present here. Again, the conscious use of an 
entertainment  format  projects  excitement.  But  the  symbol-system  failed:  we  have  to 
distinguish between the encoding, that is to say, an intuitive aim to generate a paratelic mode, 
and the decoding, which in the case of our groups was aberrant. The media clip simply did not 
work with a Western audience, who found it too crassly manipulative and ingratiating. The 
focus of the audiences was on the failure of the symbol system. 
Animated Cartoon - The impact here was not on young men, but on Bangladeshi mothers from 
Tower Hamlets. It was the only text we showed to have a measurably strong political impact. 
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Its  overt  entertainment  format  and  narrative  momentum,  its  speed,  seemed  designed  to 
generate and sustain the paratelic mode. That it succeeded with one segment in such an 
unexpected way, demonstrates the subtlety of influence processes, and that they do not fit any 
stereotypes.  Yet  mothers  are  crucial  in  Islamic  society,  in  determining  its  values,  in 
influencing its socialisation and in turning a blind eye, or providing encouragement, when 
sons (and daughters) empathise/sympathise with terror groups. 
Al-Zawahiri ‘Talking Head’ – The clip encouraged some general agreement but encountered 
credibility problems. Notably, two of the groups felt the message was ‘boring’ and should be 
taken with a ‘pinch of salt’ – hardly inspiring the paratelic mode in our groups despite the 
explicit  call  to  ‘Jihad’  against  the  West.  Nevertheless,  two  groups  did  indicate  that  the 
message might resonate with others since ‘up to a point it made sense’ and might muster 
support amongst those ‘easily corrupted’, which psychologists might take as coded language 
from some in the groups that they themselves could see merit in the message. 
Siddique Khan ‘Talking Head’ – Curiously, the groups whilst not being excited by this message 
themselves could see that others might well be, despite the fact that it does not seek in itself to 
incite violence but instead to celebrate revenge and to taunt. In other words, the paratelic 
mode was not explicitly acknowledged by our group members but they could see how it might 
inspire others who feel alienated or aggrieved. 
The Al Qaeda News Bulletin - This media clip used a genre which was both mimic and parasitic in 
adopting an entertainment format. Again, the narrative drive fits comfortably into the paratelic 
mode, but again there was an aberrant decoding by discussion groups and the media clip had 
the reverse effect to that intended. Its assumptions, for example, of an indiscriminate hatred of 
Americans, and not just the American government, was fundamental to any success it might 
have in generating and sustaining a paratelic mode. But this did not happen. Our groups 
sympathised with vulnerable Americans. The problem with a western-domiciled audience is 
that they interpret this media clip and the others differently from how we might infer a Middle 
Eastern audience might, even though both groups are targets of terror states and organisations. 
 
In summary, we propose that Reversal Theory might help to explain the effectiveness or otherwise 
of terrorist media clips although the media clips we tested were not effective with our discussion 
groups. We began this research with the suspicion that the media clips would be persuasive to some 
degree even with a UK Muslim audience, especially young men. In applying Reversal Theory we 
sought an explanation of that anticipated persuasiveness. Nevertheless, the symbol systems used 
and/or decoded by our subjects were ineffective. This does not undermine the relevance of Reversal 
Theory or invalidate our use of it; instead it implies that western-domiciled Muslims are likely to 
have limited predisposition to Jihadist sentiment such as that encoded in our test media clips. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Given the exploratory nature of our research, we outline a series of testable propositions to develop 
the field. In particular, we need to understand how audiences process emotional political ideological 
messaging, particularly that from terrorist organisations, from the perspective of Reversal Theory. 
Propaganda tends to operate as a coherent integrating perspective, where complex phenomena are 
reduced to simple and internally consistent explanatory formula to incite excitement and violent 
action. Underlying causal unities are perceived where none exist. A common assumption is that 
Muslims are ‘radicalised’ by Al-Qaeda and others by their Islamist propaganda; but, on the other 
hand, an alternative thesis exists that radical propaganda might instead actively create anxiety and 
repulsion rather than excitement. Do Islamist media communications therefore only appeal to the 
pre-committed, refreshing commitment certainly but not aiding the further recruitment of suicidal 
foot soldiers? This is a key question. It is unlikely that vulnerable respondents completely take in all 
the claims of the propagandist. Rather, they are bored subjects seeking excitement, becoming no 
mere object of persuasion but complicit in the hallucination of outrage and justice retrieved. There 
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is likely to be a greater susceptibility to Islamic propaganda amongst those who feel the greatest 
mismatch between their ‘diaspora’ culture and the ‘British’ culture. This mismatch will probably 
cluster around the belief that ‘British’ culture encourages excessive hedonism, fornication and 
drinking and other ‘corrupt’ practices. Our adult audiences per se seemed more likely to connect 
with the emotional material in the cartoon tested, despite its lack of authenticity. A distinction has 
been made, notably by Goebbels, between overtly political propaganda and propaganda disguised as 
entertainment (Taylor, 1983). The cartoons might succeed because they function as entertainment, 
or more precisely, because the format of a cartoon announces itself as entertainment, lowering 
perceptual defences to paratelic-excitement inducement. Therefore, we advocate the following 
propositions for further research: 
 
Proposition 1: Respondents with complex ethnic identities are more likely to be excited (i.e. 
induced into paratelic-excitement mode) by Islamist ideological messaging than those whose 
identities are more strongly held. 
Proposition 2: Inducement into paratelic-excitement by Islamist ideological messaging depends 
on the subject’s age and gender, with young male subjects those most likely to be induced. 
Proposition  3:  Subjects  feeling  contempt  for  Western  culture  are  more  likely  to  enter  the 
paratelic-excitement mode after watching Islamist ideological messages than those not feeling 
contempt. 
Proposition 4: Islamist emotional messaging framed in certain genre formats (e.g. cartoons) is 
more likely to induce the paratelic-excitement mode in subjects than others (e.g. ‘talking head’). 
 
More needs to be understood about the relative strengths of the various persuasion paradigms on 
offer. In our study, Al-Zawahiri’s style of rational discourse was impactful to some but not to others. 
On this evidence, his organization is neither mad nor deluded. Pseudo-reason can be more powerful 
as persuasion than crudely emotional appeals. The emotional resonance generated in the Iranian 
cartoon was effective because the cartoons functioned at a more abstract and symbolic level. 
Therefore, we propose the need to research the impact of this specific format and genre of Islamist 
emotional messaging on adults as well as considering the emotional impact of interpersonal forms 
of propaganda diffusion. For example, members of the young female group from East London 
reported that they had attended events where images of Muslim women and children who had been 
killed and mutilated by ‘Western’ forces were shown: “ ... it’s so ironic that the media shows 
Muslims in a bad light . . . but when it comes to the Muslim countries being thrashed by Israel, they 
don’t show that. It is only in the conferences that you see that”. 
 
The research reveals some difficulties in researching this cross-cultural and sensitive subject. There 
are difficulties to researching the persuadability of Islamist ideological messaging; many subjects 
may not want to acknowledge their susceptibility to paratelic inducement. There is an argument in 
sensitive research environments for respondents to self-report (Tourangeau and Smith, 1996), or for 
researchers to adopt the stylistic conventions of an intimate interview to achieve self-disclosure 
(Birch and Miller, 2000). There are clearly issues of privacy, confidentiality and ethics surrounding 
this type of research (Hill, 1995) which should be further considered. 
 
Conclusion 
Our exploratory study highlights how terrorist groups might be using modern media and political 
marketing methods to proselytise their message of violent extremism, to induce reversal to the 
paratelic-excitement  mode  in  bored  and  dissatisfied  Muslims  to  recruit  supporters  to  their 
ideological cause. Just as democracies use political marketing to recruit voters, so terrorists can use 
political marketing/propaganda techniques to recruit sympathisers or even would-be suicide- 
bombers (i.e. the ‘dark side of political marketing’). This very idea would be incendiary if we did 
not know the communication process and the supporter recruitment processes to be fraught with 
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difficulty and ambiguity. British Muslims do not become radicalised solely through a hypodermic 
needle method of propaganda injected from afar by terrorist groups using internet-based branded 
communications (see Kimmage, 2008). British Muslim opinion is variegated not monolithic, with 
strong latent emotions (e.g. sympathy for the Palestinians). Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
they are  necessarily susceptible  to  paratelic-excitement  inducement  and  sympathetic to  violent 
action. Because we have no measure of how tenaciously those views are held or how predisposed 
Muslims of different nationalities are to terrorist ideological messaging, we have indicated a set of 
four research propositions to explore how Islamist messages are received by British Muslims to 
evaluate their emotional resonance and their potential for paratelic-excitement inducement. By this 
means we hope to inspire further research in this critical area to aid legitimate governments around 
the world to design counter-messaging aimed at inoculating their Muslim populations against 
Islamist terrorist ideology designed to inspire and inculcate violence from within. 
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Appendix 1 
See list of clips used in this study in Table A below, taken from the www.memritv.org website. 
 
Table A – Brief Description and Synopsis of Clips Used Within the Study 
 
CLIP 
NO. 
DESCRIPTION BRIEF SYNOPSIS 
1 A bridegroom turns into a suicide bomber in 
an Iranian TV music video, broadcast by 
IRIB/Jamm-E-Jam3 (Iran) – Diffused 28th 
October 2005 (3 mins 25 secs) 
Uses the stylistic conventions of MTV/consumer advertising. 
Viewer perceives a pop video or consumer advertisement. 
Boy and girl look lovingly at each other, what sounds to be 
popular Iranian music is played, yellow ribbons are placed on 
the car. Is this a wedding? The soft-focus conventions, the 
sexiness, the sentimentality are all apparent, but they are not 
used to selling perfume, as increasingly becomes apparent, 
they are selling suicide-murder. Something is not quite right. 
Much is made of the loving interplay between man and 
woman. The car is being loaded. Perhaps they're going on 
honeymoon? But what is the mechanical mechanism in the 
boot, why is the woman tearful? Then when we see that he is 
leaving her to drive towards a military checkpoint we realise 
something is amiss. Suddenly the soldier group at the 
checkpoint splits in half, terrified: to reveal an Israeli flag 
behind them. This is a suicide mission and a suicide bomber. 
Parting with the beautiful young woman is symbolic of what 
the suicide bomber is leaving on earth. 
2 Palestinian  Children  clash  with  an  Israeli 
soldier  in  an  Iranian  animated  movie, 
broadcast by IRIB/Jamm-E-Jam 1 (Iran), 
diffused 28th October 2005 (2 mins) 
This is an Iranian cartoon based on the Western cultural myth 
of David and Goliath. The children in the cartoon are western 
in dress, and white. The story begins with children throwing 
stones at Israeli troops, one of whom advances towards them 
menacingly. Their pathetic little rocks are powerless against 
the Israeli giant, who proceeds to machine-gun the lot of 
them. He does not figure as a person but as a Cyborg, and his 
face seems to be made not of skin but steel. The remaining 
boy, infuriated and grief-stricken, picks up a sling, inserts a 
stone  and  throws  at  the  advancing  Cyborg.  He  reels, 
dissolves into a skeleton and behind him is revealed a 
cadaverous figure of Uncle Sam! These are well-drawn 
cartoon figures and the clip exhibits high production values. 
It   is   a   sophisticated,   stylish,   individualistic   piece   of 
animation. Israelis are dehumanized. The subtext is that Jews 
murder children and the cartoon functions almost as the 
emotional biography of a suicide bomber. 
3 Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri claims 
responsibility for the London bombings, 
discusses elections in Afghanistan and States: 
“Reform can only take place through Jihad”, 
broadcast by Al-Jazeera TV (Qatar), diffused 
19th September 2005 (5 mins 35 secs) 
This  is  a  classical  headshot  ‘political  ad’.  The  physical 
argumentation is punchy, well-controlled, and primarily a 
political argument. The effect is more politician than rabble- 
rouser. His tone is rational. What he offers is an animated 
and articulate flow of argument to convince waverers, which 
ties all their grievances together. Individually the points made 
are plausible. It is the conclusions drawm, that is to say Jihad 
is the answer, which are fallacious, apparently flowing from 
the cumulative force of the individual propositions but in 
reality a complete non-sequitur. The meta-synthesis is that 
there is a global conspiracy against Islam, that all attacks on 
Islam are interconnected and inspired by the same source. 
The message: Jihad is the only rational answer in a Western- 
dominated world. 
 
Table A Continued - Brief Description and Synopsis of Clips Used Within the Study 
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CLIP 
NO. 
DESCRIPTION BRIEF SYNOPSIS 
4 Mohammed Siddique Khan, one of the suicide 
bombers  who  carried  out  the  London 
bombings in a video-taped message: “Our 
words are dead until we give them life with 
our blood”, broadcast by Al-Jazeera TV 
(Qatar), diffused 1st  September 2005 (2 mins 
27 secs) 
Khan was leader of the July 7 bombing group and this clip is 
a hymn to revenge and a self-eulogy, recorded before the 
atrocity was committed but aired 2 months after in a ‘talking 
head’ approach. His message is very simple. You're killing 
‘my’ people (the ummah) therefore I'm killing you. The 
secondary message is that ‘this is for real’ and that you are 
being punished for voting in this government, and presumably 
its decision to go to war in Iraq/Afghanistan. The central 
premise is that ‘you’ have an irrational hatred of ‘his’ people 
and seek to kill them, and that this is all part of a global 
conspiracy against Islam. Separate and unconnected conflicts 
are linked. Britain thus becomes responsible for Muslims 
suffering in, say, Chechnya or Kashmir, even though it has no 
power of decision or action there. 
5 Al-Qaeda Internet news broadcast celebrates 
U.S. hurricanes and Gaza pullout, reports 
Zirqawi’s Anti-Shiite campaign and chemical 
mortar shells in Iraq, broadcast on The 
Internet, accessed September 2005 (4 mins 56 
secs) 
This  clip   mimics  CNN  or   BBC  World  Service  news 
broadcasts and has contemporaneity in its stylistic posture, to 
the point of pastiche. Graphics flash and morph in a modern 
fashion, imitating conventional satellite channels. The attempt 
is to impress us, by technological sophistication, with the idea 
that this is an advanced organisation doing the broadcasting. 
To refresh our memory, the clip ends with all slogans and 
brand identifiers again revealing a self-conscious 
understanding of the role of symbolism and imagery as 
meaning signifiers and identity-definers in a media age. What 
we encounter after the logo display is a newsreader at a desk 
reading the news notes, from the terrorist perspective. This 
gives us a jolt since it is ‘their’ perspective on ‘our’ society 
using Western symbol systems, such as the symbolism of 
news-reading impartiality, where the assumption is that news 
is not a social construct but a scientific given. The aim is to 
show Al Qaeda in business as a virtual nation complete with 
national television news suggesting the globalisation of Al 
Qaeda. 
 
